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The purpose of this MBA Project is to investigate and analyze different forms of blast 
mitigation technologies that provide safe temporary storage, and in the event of a 
detonation, provide protection measures for personnel and property. A comprehensive 
cost comparison of an Explosive Storage Magazine (ESM) and two alternatives: the 
Explosive Remnants of War Collection Point (ERW-CP) and Blastwrap are analyzed to 
determine future options. The goal of this project is to identify and document both cost 
comparisons, as well as requirement satisfaction for the safe and cost-effective temporary 
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The purpose of this MBA project is to determine what nonrecurring and recurring costs, 
resulting from a conventional means of explosive storage, and to examine the practicality 
of implementing conventional explosive storage in a semi / nonpermissive environment 
to help facilitate the safer collection of hazardous ordnance items in villages and towns 
around the world. The second objective of this project is to compare two relatively new 
and ecologically friendly forms of explosive storage with those of conventional means 
and to ascertain whether, in fact, the benefits provided by this new technology are more 
cost effective and whether they provide similar or greater benefits to the intended 
villages. Finally, once the data has been compared and weighed, this study will provide a 
recommendation as to which system is better suited for semi / nonpermissive 
environments. 
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I. EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW): THE PROBLEM 
A. ERW 
Explosive remnants of war are left-over pieces of ordnance in countries all over 
the world that remain on the soil of these countries for years, if not decades before they 
are eventually discovered by someone during reconstruction of the area. Sometimes, 
personnel stumble upon various items such as artillery shells, grenades, or even various 
forms of cluster munitions. These are all extremely dangerous to handle, if one is not 
familiar with the functioning of these various devices. During postconflict, these items 
are slow to be disposed of and even more costly when the conflicting parties may no 
longer have the economic resources to support such disposal operations. For these 
reasons, ERW are a global problem that many nations and the United Nations 
acknowledge and for which they commit resources to help correct the problem. With the 
current conditions of the world economies, it is essential to try to evaluate the best 
solution that will provide the most benefit for the lowest acceptable cost. 
The difference between ERW, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and abandoned 
ordnance must be clarified Per the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) Article V on Explosive Remnants of War: (Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Deming, 2004) 
1. UXO 
Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for 
use and used in an armed conflict (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Deming, 2004). It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have 




Figure 1: UXO Disposal in Iraq (From Wikipedia, 2003) 
2. Abandoned Explosives 
Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been 
left behind or dumped by a party in an armed conflict, and which is no longer under 
control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may 
or may not have been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use (Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Deming, 2004).  
Together, UXO and abandoned explosives comprise ERW as defined by the 
United Nations and the current 69 states that are bound by this protocol from the CCW 
(Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Deming, 2004). 
B. CURRENT METHODS OF DETECTION AND CLEARANCE 
Detection 
The current capabilities to detect various ordnance items consist of using costly 
detection equipment and methods that require an immense amount of time. Within stable 
and secure countries like the United States and most countries in Europe, such methods 
are more practical and using methods and technology such as multiple metal detector 
arrays to locate ferrous and nonferrous objects underneath the ground may be practical. 
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However, in countries like Afghanistan, Laos, and the Philippines most methods of  
detection occur by the random chance of stumbling upon such objects from either from 
construction projects in previous war-torn areas, or just walking through fields or other 
areas where conflict may have occurred (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Deming, 2003).  
 
Figure 2:  Afghan Detecting and Clearing Landmines (From Villano, 2009) 
Clearance 
Once these hazardous objects are located, it may be impractical to move the ERW 
due to its current unknown or unstable condition. Some pieces of ordnance may be 
exuding explosive residues and mere contact could cause a high order detonation. Other 
times, fuses may be deteriorated and in such a state that the ordnance is essentially ready 
to detonate and—merely waiting for the right signal. For this reason, clearance should 
always involve trained and qualified personnel to assist. Most of the qualified personnel 
come from the over 42 demining programs1 established all around the world to assist in 
the manual clearance of landmines.  
Many villagers in troubled countries around the world handle these pieces of 
ordnance without the requisite knowledge and training, and could be putting themselves 
as well as other personnel in serious jeopardy (Personal experience of the author, 2010). 
The intent of villagers who are trying to clear the problem themselves and keep their 
                                                 
1 Executive Summary Manual Mine Clearance Book, 1. 
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community safe, is a good thing, but can have serious consequences. Training enough 
people in the techniques of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and supplying them with 
the necessary tools is not cost effective and could have potential security concerns with 
the distribution of such knowledge. Only through education and a cost-effective forms of 
technology will this hazard be effectively mitigated and, at the same time, provide 
villagers with a trade that they can use in and around their community. 
The best option for villagers in these hostile environments would be to store these 
hazardous items in a secure and cost-effective containment system. Securing these items 
in a storage container at a safe distance away from the village until qualified personnel 
are able to dispose of the ordnance properly and safely is the best option for areas where 
resources are scarce.  
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II. CONTAINMENT SYSTEM OPTIONS 
This research examines three possible options for temporary containment and 
blast mitigation systems that provide portability, cost effectiveness, and ease of set up 
and maintenance, and blast containment / mitigation characteristics. The three types of 
candidate solutions for containment / mitigation are detailed below and include a standard 
explosive storage magazine (ESM), a BlastGard blast mitigation device, and an 
explosives remnant of war collection point constructed from papercrete and other locally 
sourced materials. All of these systems provide a stable form of storage for ERW, and it 
should be noted that if a detonation should occur in any of these systems, they would be 
damaged beyond repair and reusing any of them would either be impossible or 
impractical. 
 The ESM is essentially the standard for explosives storage in countries like the 
United States where the laws are very strict regarding how one can safely and securely 
store hazardous devices and materials. Some commands assisting these afflicted regions 
may choose to exercise a similar option by purchasing such an item and placing it in a 
village. Although the requirements will meet or exceed those governed by U.S. 
authorities, the logistics and practicality of placing such an item in a village in 
Afghanistan, for example could prove challenging from the point of view of transporting 








A. EXPLOSIVE STORAGE MAGAZINE  
The ESM this research uses, as a baseline is the advanced EOD storage magazine, 
manufactured by Armag Corp. 
 
 
Figure 3: Advanced EOD Storage Magazine (From Armag Corporation, 2011) 
 The advanced EOD storage magazine is a four-foot by four-foot by four-foot steel 
box. The magazine is rated to store approximately ten pounds net explosive weight 
(NEW) with a maximum credible event (MCE) of zero  (Armag Corporation, 2006). This 
magazine is designed for outdoor use while the majority of magazines are designed for 
indoor use. Per the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), outdoor 
magazines must be cleared 25 feet in all directions of debris, trash, and other brush that is 
less than ten feet tall (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2011). In 
addition, any volatile materials must be kept at least 50 feet away from the magazine. 
These ESMs are easily purchased through the U.S. General Services Administration 
(GSA) and range in price from several hundred dollars to several thousand dollars, 
depending on dimensions and features (Clark, 2011). The advanced EOD storage 
magazine pictured carries a price tag of $3,989.70 (Clark, 2011). 
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B. BLASTGARD INC. BLASTWRAP 
The second product examined is Blastwrap. Blastwrap is a material that resembles 
bubble wrap, but each of the individual cells contains a mixture of fire extinguishing 
materials and perlite (Blastgard International, 2008). Perlite is a volcanic glass that, when 
heated, causes expansion of the material from seven to sixteen times its original volume. 
During the expansion process, it absorbs much of the blast impulse from the detonation 
and, at the same time releases the trapped water, helping to extinguish the fireball  
(Svensson, 2005). The current U.S. GSA price for Blastwrap is $71.25 per square foot. 
 
 
Figure 4: Blastwrap (From Popular Science, 2005) 
C. EXPLOSIVE REMANTS OF WAR COLLECTION POINT KIT 
Finally, the ERW-CP kit will be examined, including its feasibility to compete 
with the two commercial options described above. The ERW-CP kit consists of a 55-
gallon drum that contains instructions on how to create a structure that is safe for the 
temporary storage of explosives until qualified personnel can arrive. These personnel can 
then properly dispose of the ordnance collected around the village or area in question. 
The main structure is built from papercrete, which is a locally sourced material. This kit 
contains minimal equipment from a weight perspective and minimizes the cost of 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) components. These factors allow for stimulation of the 
local economy to further help the country with the munitions contamination problem of 
ERW.  
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Papercrete is essentially part Portland cement and an aggregate of recycled paper 
or other cellulosic-based material and other additives, if desired. The recycled paper is an 
easily procured item that can be any form of paper or cellulosic material (Wikipedia, 
2011). The paper is processed into a hammer mill to grind the paper to a fine grain size, 
which allows for a homogenous mix with the Portland cement. A solar charging kit that 
comes with the ERW-CP kit allows for an environmentally friendly solution that powers 
the hammer mill. In addition, the solar charging kit also powers a direct current motor 
that is used to mix everything in the 55-gallon drum.  
While the papercrete is being mixed, other personnel can begin setting up the 
form that the mixture will be poured into. The form is assembled from materials that 
come inside the kit. Two cylinders are set up vertically and reinforced with soil from the 
surrounding area. The papercrete is poured and the center is hollowed out to allow for the 
storage of hazardous devices. Once the papercrete has properly cured, which can be 
heavily dependent on weather conditions and terrain, the form materials can be removed 




Figure 5: ERW-CP Basic Design 
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D. SCIENCE OF BLAST EFFECTS 
Understanding the physical and chemical reactions of what transpires during a 
detonation is essential to understanding how these products provide safety for personnel 
in a surrounding area. Everyone has seen an explosion at some point in their lives, 
whether in real life or in a movie. However, most people do not understand the nature of 
what is really going on during the event. Explosive materials come in all shapes, sizes, 
and various chemical compositions. Once an understanding of the detonation event is 
obtained, people can begin to decipher the quantitative and qualitative measurements 
from that event and emplace practical technologies that will contribute greatly to safety. 
Understanding the basic science allows personnel to develop and test methods such as the 
technologies stated above to aide in the containment and blast mitigation of ERW. 
When an explosive material detonates, the material undergoes a rapid chemical 
reaction, transforming into a volume several orders of magnitude greater than the original 
volume of the explosive material. When a detonation of high explosives occurs, several 
things happen. First, peak air pressure increases dramatically, creating a shock wave front 
(Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). Once this shock wave 
is created, it begins to move outward in a generally omni-directional fashion from the 
point of detonation. As soon as the temperature begins to drop, and the blast wave begins 
to decay, the wave degenerates into a typical sound wave (Naval Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Technology Division, 1998). The airflow begins to reverse direction, creating a 
temporary negative phase, until conditions quickly return to normal atmospheric 
conditions. Below is a graph that depicts the atmospheric phases of a detonation over the 
period of time for the event.  
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Figure 6: Blast Wave Characteristics  (From Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Technology Division, 1998)3 
Now that the characteristics of blast overpressure are understood, the secondary 
effect of fragmentation must be explained to fully understand the ERW in question. 
Fragmentation is the secondary effect of a piece of ordnance detonating and is literally 
the fragments of the case that the explosive material was housed (Naval Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). Casing for munitions can be subdivided 
into light and heavy cases. Light casing is defined as having 80 percent of the total 
munitions weight in explosive material, or the main charge (Naval Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Technology Division, 1998). Heavy casing is simply having munitions where 
the explosive material weight is less than 80 percent of the total munitions weight (Naval 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). All of this information is 
incorporated to develop the equation:  
 
 
Where D is the distance in feet or meters for a given pressure per square inch 
(PSI) value, K is the K-Factor for a given PSI value or a safe fragment distance, and W is 
the total weight of TNT or its equivalent.  
3WKD 
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The K-factor is used to help determine the minimum safe distances for the area 
required for the three different technologies mentioned above. K-factor tables have been 
developed to reliably plot and determine the expected PSI value that would be 
experienced from a detonation at various distances from the point of detonation (Naval 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). For the purpose of this 
research project, we will consider K to be 30 as the factor for determining distances for 
safe temporary storage. 
At a K-factor of 30, the blast overpressure would be approximately two PSI 
(Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). Human blast 
tolerances can have large variances, depending on the amount of explosive, type of 
explosive, and the duration of the explosion. Human blast tolerances for explosive 
durations ranging from three to five milliseconds have been recorded for the various 
critical gas-filled organs that would be most susceptible during an explosion (Naval 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). The pressure threshold for 
lung damage is between 30 and 40 PSI with severe lung hemorrhaging at 80 PSI  (Naval 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, 1998). At a K factor of 30, the only 
major blast overpressure hazard is temporary eardrum damage, which occurs at .2 PSI, 
resulting in temporary hearing loss (Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology 
Division, 1998). This is an acceptable risk because to achieve a K factor of 300, which is 
the value where the PSI level would be .07 PSI, would require too much distance 
between a village and storage site, while still requiring an adequate amount of security. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS 
A. COST COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: 
The hypothesis for this cost comparative analysis is that Blastwrap may be a more 
cost-effective solution because it is already on the commercial market. Although it is a 
high cost per square foot alternative, economy of scale may bring the price down to more 
affordable levels. From a purely cost perspective, Blastwrap is ready now and users could 
purchase mass quantities of Blastwrap and secure it to the inside of a metal cylinder such 
as old-style trashcans or empty 55-gallon drums.  
However, the benefit of the ERW-CP kit is not only blast mitigation and as a 
temporary storage structure, but also a trade that can be learned in constructing papercrete 
building materials, a skill set that could be used to construct other structures. It may also 
allow local economies to be stimulated to help benefit everyone. The dual-use nature of 
this system, compared to the others, may prove to make the difference in the end.  
 16
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BASELINE AND 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS 
A. ESM BASELINE 
1. ESM Nonrecurring Costs 
The ESM is the standard for explosive storage and containment and the cost 
associated with that system is the up-front capital investment of $3,989.70 for each ESM. 
This does not, however, include the cost of transportation of the system to its intended 
destination. Delivery within the United States costs another $1,459.00. The system would 
then have to be transported to an overseas area by ship or aircraft. Although this would be 
completed through the U.S. Government, there is still a cost associated with 
transportation to the afflicted area. The estimate in this model, for the hidden cost, will be 
$3,000 for transport by aircraft, due to the size, weight, and flight hours, to the intended 
destination. Once in the afflicted country, the estimated cost for ground transportation is 
$2,000. U.S. personnel would perform setup of the ESM in the village, on the ground, 
while conducting village support operations (VSO). U.S. members would then be 
responsible for training indigenous personnel in proper maintenance and handling of 
dangerous items for temporary storage until EOD personnel arrived at the village for 
proper disposal. 
Nonrecurring Cost: 
 - One ESM $3,989.70 
 - Delivery to U.S. receiving area $1,459.00 
 - Air Transport $3,000.00 
 - Ground Transport $2,000.00 




2. ESM Recurring Costs 
Recurring costs for the ESM will be estimated using a marginal cost model, 
limited to the training of U.S. personnel as units redeploy and deploy from the region. In 
addition, training and retraining for indigenous personnel will happen from time-to-time 
as people come and go from the village. It is difficult to place an “actual” cost for 
training. For purposes of this analysis, estimates for training costs will be the number of 
training hours U.S. personnel spend training indigenous personnel. Using the current 
monthly pay tables for U.S. military personnel and dividing it by the number of logged 
hours units spend training villagers, we can assume a rough estimate of the tax dollars 
spent.  
Recurring Costs: 
(E5 base pay X 3) X (O3 base pay) / Hours of training completed 
per month = dollars / month 
The formula above is an estimate using an E5, which is an enlisted person in his 
fifth pay grade; for example, an E5 in the U.S. Army is a sergeant. The O3, a captain in 
the U.S. Army, is a military officer in his third pay grade. 
 Maintenance for the ESM will be limited to general maintenance and inspection 
of materials to ensure cleanliness and to monitor the degradation of materials, i.e., 
corrosion. Due to the material makeup and construction of this ESM, its lifecycle will 
likely be several decades. Security training will also be recurring until the village can 
self-sustain and U.S. presence is no longer required. Security with an ESM does not need 
to be as in-depth as the alternatives, since the ESM has an exterior of one-quarter inch-
thick steel with a high security hasp lock. 
3. ESM Nonrecurring Benefits 
The main nonrecurring benefit, as with all the alternatives in this analysis, is that 
if a detonation does occur, the system will no longer be a viable option for explosive 
storage. However, the value in potentially saving the lives of U.S. personnel and villagers 
is tremendous, not only for the impact on families and friends, but because the 
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productivity of that individual is not lost or degraded. Losing a life degrades the labor 
force, adding an additional labor burden on the remaining individuals.  
 Along with the lifesaving capabilities, a detonation within the confines of an ESM 
would reduce collateral damage to the surrounding structures or property that may be in 
the vicinity of the magazine. This is a non-quantifiable benefit due to the amount and 
type of explosive ordnance that may be contained in the ESM, as different types of 
explosives can be more damaging than others. 
4. ESM Recurring Benefits 
The recurring benefits of an ESM include explosive device decontamination for 
greater utilization of agricultural land and the further expansion of construction projects 
in and around villages. As explosive device decontamination continues, incidents 
involving unintended detonation would decrease, decreasing the need for emergency 
medical treatment and allow non-governmental organizations (NGOs) easier access to 
afflicted areas to assist with other issues afflicting a village. With less explosive material 
in the area, the likelihood of terrorists and insurgents acquiring materials for IED 
construction would also be reduced. 
B. BLASTGARD INC. BLASTWRAP (ALTERNATIVE ONE): 
1. Nonrecurring Costs 
The nonrecurring costs of Blastwrap include the initial capital investment and 
deployment to the afflicted areas. Setup is minimal, consisting of cutting strips to desired 
lengths to line the inside of the trashcan or other receptacle. The strips can be secured in 
place with a fast-setting adhesive, and the materials themselves are lightweight, which 
makes for easy transportation.  
Nonrecurring Cost: 
- Blastwrap two inch-thick package in strips (40.5 inches x 10 1/8 inch 
wide):   2 X $71.25 = $142.50 
-  55-gallon industrial plastic trash cans: $55.00 
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- 5-gallon 3M Fastbond insulation adhesive 49: $290.00 
- Air transport: $2,000.00 
-Ground transport: $1,000.00 
TOTAL Nonrecurring costs = $3,487.50 
2. Recurring Costs 
Recurring costs for the Blastwrap system would have similar costs, such as 
training and regular maintenance. However, it should be noted that training and 
maintenance would be drastically reduced in comparison to the ESM. Security training, 
to ensure only authorized personnel are accessing these explosive items, would be the 
most intensive training required with this system. Increased security will have to be 
maintained since there is a significant trade-off in physical security with regard to the 
access of a plastic container, compared to a steel box with a high-security hasp lock. 
Added security measures will require additional training hours in anti-terrorism 
force protection (AT/FP) for the area. Along with added AT/FP, the villagers will need to 
train in various techniques of explosive identification and handling to ensure maximum 
safety is achieved. Again, estimated training costs can be computed through the simple 
model stated above in the ESM section.  
3. Nonrecurring Benefits 
The benefit of the Blastwrap system is that its several orders of magnitude lighter 
than the ¼ inch steel ESM and has an innovative solution with regard to blast mitigation. 
The nonrecurring cost savings of $6,961.20 per unit alone make this a very attractive 
solution in an environment with constrained budgets in harsh economic times.  
The ESM will have to be a stand-alone, outdoor, temporary storage with no 
electrical systems, fire suppression devices, or environmental control systems. In this 
environment, Blastwrap’s individual cells are made up of an eco-friendly fire retardant 
combined with the perlite volcanic glass, which provides a remarkable fire suppression 
capability. In the event of a detonation, Blastwrap provides protection against secondary 
fragmentation and, in essence, will not become part of the problem if the worst does 
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happen. The ESM could produce secondary fragments due to its steel exterior, given a 
sufficient quantity of explosive material stored within. 
4. Recurring Benefits 
One of the major recurring benefits of Blastwrap is the ease of deployment and 
follow-on of additional units if desired or needed. Although it is difficult to quantify 
these benefits in a dollar amount, the lifesaving capability of this technology is 
significant, and the drastically improved quality of life of those affected with explosive 
device contamination provides an additional significant benefit.  
C. ERW-CP (ALTERNATIVE TWO) 
1. Nonrecurring Costs 
The nonrecurring costs associated with the ERW-CP have a minimal amount of 
capital investment, comparable to those of Blastwrap. Deployment of the kit is as easy as 
placing a 55-gallon drum on a pallet and shipping it to the afflicted area. Setup of the 
ERW-CP can take substantially longer than Blastwrap since it can take, on average, three 
weeks for the papercrete to set properly, depending on the environmental conditions. In 
the event of a detonation, the structure will be damaged to the point that it will either 
have to be rebuilt or repaired using another preparation of papercrete to the affected areas 
inside the unit.. 
Nonrecurring Costs: 
- ERW-CP kit: $2,937.95    
 - 55-gallon drum: $77.95 
 - Solar Power Station: $1,500.00 
 - Other Kit Materials: $1,360.00 
- Air transport: $2,000.00    
- Ground transport: $1,000.00 
TOTAL = $5,937.95 
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2. Recurring Costs 
Depending on the type and amount of explosive contamination in the area, the 
only direct recurring costs should be the purchase of locally sourced raw materials to 
construct ERW-CP. Indirectly, the training, by U.S. persons, of personnel in and around 
the village on the use of ERW-CP’s and the security that should be in place for these 
hazardous items is the only recurring cost. 
3. Nonrecurring Benefits 
The primary benefit for the ERW-CP is the blast mitigation it provides by 
directing the blast energy upwards and away from personnel and property. Another direct 
benefit that it is designed to catch the primary fragmentation that is produced during the 
detonation of small to mid-size projectiles or other explosive devices.  
The cost savings of the ERW-CP, compared to the ESM baseline, is $4,510.75 
and although this is $2,450.45 less than Blastwrap, Blastwrap does not have any uses 
other than blast mitigation. 
4. Recurring Benefits 
The recurring benefits of this innovative design in blast mitigation far exceed 
those of any other technology or technique available in the commercial market. 
Papercrete engineering is a real trade that can be taught to indigenous personnel with 
minimal cost and, at the same time, may stimulate local economies in the afflicted area to 
help develop infrastructure using the same techniques, all while providing an ecological 
solution to the environment. Papercrete, as a material, is heavily composed of cellulosic 
substances, using recycled paper or other plant life, such as tree bark, saw dust, or any 
other cellulose-based material, makes the impact to the environment minimal.  
Along with the kit’s intent to minimize carbon emissions, it comes with a solar 
power source used to power the equipment to make the papercrete. The solar power 





built around the idea that everything in the kit should have a dual-use purpose. This is 
where the recurring benefits of the ERW-CP far outweigh those with the ESM or 
Blastwrap.  
Although it is difficult to quantify the qualitative nature of this recurring benefit, 
care should be given to considering the economic gains a village or nation may acquire 
from opening up such a market. Papercrete can be used and is intended for domestic 
construction in the country it is deployed to. Papercrete can be fashioned into walls or 
bricks for domicile construction  (Hart, 2001). Papercrete is dimensionally stable when 
taking in water and drying out. Papercrete will absorb moisture if it rains or if the climate 
is very humid  (Hart, 2001). In addition, the material is fairly fireproof, with only minor 
smoldering effects if the papercrete catches fire. The only thing that may be required is a 
water-repellant paint or coating to keep moisture out if the environmental conditions are 
unfavorable for curing. 
 
Figure 7: Papercrete Block with Mortar (From The Center for Alternative Building 
Studies, 2005) 
D. ESTIMATES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF ALTERNATIVES TO 
AFGHANISTAN 
For one of the biggest problem areas for ERW in the world today, Afghanistan, 
estimates of the two alternatives will be calculated to determine an approximate quantity  
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of units required to help mitigate the problem within the country. There has been 
numerous data over the past ten years on ERW within Afghanistan, and using that 
information will help in the estimate. 
 
 
Figure 8: Afghanistan Incidents Map from 2008–2011 (From iMMAP, 2011) 
 
The number of incidents in Afghanistan is substantial over this brief four-year period. 
Figure 8 helps give a visual representation of the issue at hand there. More detailed 
information is provided in the two graphs below. 
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Figure 9: Trends of IED and UXO Explosions in Afghanistan from 2008–2011  
(From iMMAP, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 10: Civilian Casualties, by Incidents, in Afghanistan from 2008–2011  (From 
iMMAP, 2011) 
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From the data, a total of 4,698 explosion events have occurred between 2008 and 
2011, and of those events, approximately 3,500 civilians have been killed or seriously 
injured (iMMAP, 2011). Without a doubt, some of these events could have been 
prevented through the use of Blastwrap or an ERW-CP. The current human cost of this 
contamination is, on average, 40 Afghans killed or injured every month due to ERW (E-
MINE (Electronic Mine Information Network, 2011). Lost access to large quantities of 
productive land for livelihoods and settlement only serve to reinforce poverty, destabilize 
communities and undermine opportunities for development (E-MINE [Electronic Mine 
Information Network], 2011). We will assume that 40 ERW items per month are found 
and over the course of a year, we will estimate 480 pieces of ERW are discovered within 
Afghanistan. 
1. Blast Wrap Estimate 
With a total of 480 items found within a year, the ordnance item for the purpose 
of this estimate will be estimated as that of a 60-millimeter mortar with a net explosive 
weight 1.5 pounds of TNT. Most mortars are not filled with TNT, but rather a mixture 
called composition B. Composition B is a mixture of TNT and RDX with a small amount 
of paraffin wax for handling qualities. All different mixtures of explosives must be 
converted into a TNT equivalency so that they can be accurately compared against one 
another. For this purpose, we will assume one pound of composition B is equivalent to 
1.5 pounds of TNT. 
 Our current Blastwrap setup can hold two mortars and should be able to attenuate 
the blast effects safely. With this setup, Afghanistan would require an initial 240 
Blastwrap setups. 
 
- Blastwrap two inch thick package in strips (40.5 inches x 10 1/8 inch 
wide): 2 X $71.25 = $142.50 
-  55-gallon industrial plastic trash cans: $55.00 
- 5-gallon 3M Fastbond insulation adhesive 49: $290.00 
  Total cost excluding transport – $487.50 X 240 units:  $117,000.00  
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2. ERW-CP Estimate 
Deployment of the ERW-CP kit to Afghanistan would require similar efforts with 
minor differences. The ERW-CP initial deployment to Afghanistan, to temporarily store 
the 480 mortar class items, would require 240 ERW-CP since they can hold about the 
same amount of items. The ERW-CP may also provide a better mechanism to catch the 
primary frag that is generated when an item detonates. The current kit price runs: 
- ERW-CP kit: $2,937.95 
The requirement for ERW-CPs is different from that of ERW-CP kits. 
Theoretically, we could use one kit for all of Afghanistan, but this is not realistic. For the 
purposes of this research, we consider the map above and initially deploy at least two 
ERW-CP kits to 22 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan with the highest levels of 
incidents. 
-Total cost excluding transport: $2,937.95 X 22 Provinces X 2 = $129,269.80 
Although the ERW-CP kit has a slightly higher cost, it must be noted that as soon 
as the Blastwrap has been used from either a detonation or wear and tear, more Blastwrap 
has to be purchased. The ERW-CP kit is a one-time purchase, as locally sourced the 
materials can be used to construct more ERW-CPs if the other units deteriorate or are 
destroyed.  
 28
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 29
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After careful cost comparison analysis, it is clear that an ESM for remote conflict 
zones like those in Afghanistan and the Philippines is not a good option. The mere size, 
weight, and logistics of the ESM make this a nearly impractical solution. However, the 
two alternative options of Blastwrap and the ERW-CP are excellent substitutions that are 
easily affordable and rapidly deployable to these conflict zones. From the comparative 
analysis of the two alternatives, Blastwrap has the lower cost and, if in need of quick 
containment and blast mitigation technology, Blastwrap would be the best choice. 
If, however, personnel on the ground desire a long-term relationship between the 
U.S. and possible allies the ERW-CP is a better solution due to the recurring benefits 
from papercrete engineering possibilities. This technology not only reduces the presence 
of explosive device contamination in the area, it also has the capability of creating an 
economy based upon papercrete construction, and its dual use cannot be overlooked 
when considering long-term projects to help reduce ERW in the world.  
Further analysis should be conducted on the ERW-CP kit as further design 
improvements come online that may reduce the costs of the kit to be equal to or less than 
a Blastwrap option. In addition, an individual nation or regional economic analysis on the 
impact of a papercrete market in an Afghanistan or the Philippines area may provide 
greater information on the reception of papercrete and the challenges that the market may 
face. 
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